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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

This appeal is from the lower court's granting of

Summary Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission on stipulated
facts.

The lower court's conclusions of law need be accorded

no difference by this court.
2.

The undisputed evidence in the record

demonstrates that the services performed by the mailing list
brokers were essential to the transaction and that the
taxpayer's payments were at least as much for the service
rendered by the brokers as for the lists themselves.
3.

The weight of authority supports the taxpayer's

position that the taxpayer purchased the right to use
intangible information rather than tangible personal property.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TAXPAYER IS ENTITLED TO A DE NOVO REVIEW ON APPEAL.
The taxpayer, Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., was entitled to
a de novo trial in the district court from the adverse ruling
of the State Tax Commission.

As this Court held in the case of

Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
617 P. 2d 397 (Utah 1980), a de novo review means that the
tax-payer is entitled to "a new trial in which all questions of
law and fact are addressed to that court [the district court].
Such proceedings are governed by the rules applicable to other
trials; and appeals may be taken therefrom to this court."
Id. at 399.

In Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (Utah 1981),

this Court noted that a de novo review which involves a
complete retrial upon new evidence "affords a party who is
about to suffer from administrative action a closer judicial
scrutiny than a mere review of the record of agency action, and
we think this preferable in view of the seriousness of the
administrative action and the relative ease with which the
limited factual issue can be subjected to retrial in the
district court."

Id. at 417.

The de novo review performed by the district court in
the present case was a complete retrial.

The district court

could have received new evidence and heard testimony.
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As it

was, the parties stipulated to the facts and the case was
disposed by motion for summary judgment.

Under Sacramento

Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Company, 748
P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987), this Court can review the
stipulated facts as easily as the district court did, and the
district court's conclusions of law from the stipulated facts
should be afforded no deference.
II.
IT IS UNDISPUTED, BASED ON THE STIPULATED FACTS,
THAT THE USE OF THE MAGNETIC TAPES AND PRINTED LISTS
WAS INCIDENTAL TO A SALE OF INTANGIBLE SERVICES.
The Tax Commission urges this Court to consider four
factors in determining whether the dominant purpose of the
transaction was the purchase of services:

(1) whether the

service involved was consequential or inconsequential to the
conveyance of the tangible personal property; (2) whether there
was a separate charge for the service in addition to the charge
for the products; (3) whether the purchase or renter acquired a
tangible personal property interest; and (4) whether the value
of the product was temporary or transitory.
Brief, at 6.

Respondent's

Even under this test urged by the Tax Commission,

the purchase of a service performed by the mailing list broker
was a central purpose of the transactions in question.
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1.

The service involved was consequential to the

conveyance of the magnetic tapes and printed lists.

The

record, which was stipulated to, demonstrated without dispute
that the taxpayer was purchasing a service.

Thomas Tolman

testified that "the actual money, from our point of view, to
the broker, is far more for the broker's services and what he
is able to give us than it is for the actual tape and paper.'1
(Tr. 54). Without the assistance of the broker's expertise in
selecting and refining the mailing lists, the taxpayer would be
left with a "raw" list which would have little value to the
company, if any.

(Tr. 32, 94). The taxpayer relied on the

list broker in selecting the lists and preparing them for usage
by the taxpayer.

(Tr. 29, 43). The service, under the

stipulated facts, was a consequential part of the transaction.
There was no other evidence, other than that presented by the
taxpayer, regarding the importance of the broker's services.
The Tax Commission attempts to minimize the importance of the
service rendered by the broker, but does so without any support
from the record.
2.

There was a separate charge for the service in

addition to the charge for the magnetic tapes.

The record

indicates that after the magnetic tape was used once, it was to
be returned, erased, or destroyed.

In situations where the

tape could be kept, a separate fee was charged for the tape,
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from $15 to $25.

(Tr. 11-14, 44, 46-47).

The balance of the

fee charged to the taxpayer was for the information contained
on the tape and for the service rendered by the broker in
tailoring the mailing list information in a way that would be
useful to the taxpayer.
3.

The taxpayer did not acquire a tangible personal

property interest in the information on the magnetic tape.
The taxpayer was entitled only to a one-time use of the
information contained on a magnetic tape.

Once the magnetic

tape was used to input the mailing list information into the
computer, the taxpayer was prohibited from utilizing the tape
again for the same purpose.

The taxpayer would continue to

have a tangible personal property interest in the tape itself
and could use the tape for other purposes.

The taxpayer could

not, however, use the tape to generate a mailing list.

(Tr.

11-14, 44, 46-47).
4.
transitory.

The value of the tapes was temporary and
As mentioned above, once the magnetic tape has

been used it may not be used again to generate a mailing list.
The value of the product was clearly temporary and transitory.
The essence of the transaction between the taxpayer
and the owners of the mailing lists was the purchase of mailing
list information that had been carefully prepared and refined
by a mailing list broker.

The magnetic tapes used by the
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taxpayer in this case are different from the piece of cake to
which the Tax Commission analogized in its brief.

In the

Commission's analogy, the purchase of the cake for the purpose
of consumption is the real object of the agreement between the
purchaser and the baker.

It is the cake itself that the

purchaser desires, which can be touched, tasted, smelled, and
eaten.

Plainly, the baker's services in creating the cake were

only of value to the extent that they enhanced the quality of
the appearance and the taste of the cake.

The services

performed by the mailing list brokers are different from those
performed by a baker.

The mailing list brokers utilize their

expertise and knowledge to refine a raw mailing list so as to
make it useful for the taxpayer's purposes.

The refined list

is not tangible, but may be contained or communicated through a
number of different media.

In the present case, the lists were

transferred through magnetic tapes and printed labels.

The

taxpayer is interested only in the information contained on the
tape and printed lists.

Once the information is removed from

the tape and placed in a computer, the tape ceases to have
value, demonstrating that it was not the tape itself that was
the real object of the transaction but the information
contained thereon.
The lists in this case are also different from the
multiple listing book that was at issue in Old West Realty,
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Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 110 Idaho 546, 716 P.2d
1318 (1986), the dress pattern to which the court analogized in
the case of Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust
Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983), and the toy design
package considered in Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487
A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985), cited by the Tax Commission in its brief,
at 5-7.

Each of these items could be touched and handled and

were clearly tangible.

The useful nature of a piece of cake or

a dress pattern can never be separated from the tangible
physical properties of the item.

The information on the

magnetic tape, however, consists of millions of magnetic
impulses by which the information is coded on the tape.
impulses constitute the real value of the transaction.

Those
Once

the information is removed from the tape and placed into the
computer, the tape is virtually worthless, even though it still
exists in the same form.

It has not been eaten as a piece of

cake or cut up to make a dress.
The Tax Commission in its brief argues that the
mailing lists prepared by the list brokers are not customized
but are merely "canned" lists, the form of which has been
"merely rearranged" by the broker.

Respondent's Brief at 9.

The record, however, was to the contrary.

According to the

record the lists were certainly customized and tailored to the
individual needs of the taxpayer.
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(Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62,

94-95).

Although the Tax Commission may like to think of the

mailing lists as "canned," when it stipulated to the facts in
the case below, it agreed to accept all of the facts in the
record as true.

According to the record, the lists were

clearly customized.

There was no evidence to the contrary.
III.

THE TAXPAYER PURCHASED AND USED INTANGIBLE INFORMATION.
The Tax Commission cites no case in which the purchase
or use of mailing lists was held to be taxable.

It ignores the

cases cited by the taxpayer that hold that mailing lists
transferred by magnetic tape are not tangible personal
property, Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981); Fingerhut
Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 257 N.W.2d 606 (Minn.
1977); and Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 396, 456
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982).
The Tax Commission attempts to classify the
tailor-made magnetic tapes in this case with books, videos,
cassettes, and records generally purchased by the public.

As

argued in the taxpayer's initial Brief, these items are clearly
distinguishable and have been so recognized by the majority of
cases that have considered the issue.

Books, videos, cassettes

and records can each be used multiples of times.
the item is inseparable from the item itself.
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The value of

The items, once

used, are capable of being used again--whether or not the owner
chooses to use them.
itself.

The value lies in the tangible item

The magnetic tape, however, is different.

The

information is removed and placed in the computer, leaving the
tape essentially worthless.
destroyed or erased.

The tape may thereafter be

The separate charge for the tape was

minimal.
The Tax Commission cites several cases that hold that
the use of customized computer software is taxable as tangible
personal property.

These cases represent a minority view and

demonstrate the difficulty that arises when courts attempt to
bend notions of tangibility to encompass computer-age transfers
of information.

Rather than trying to force the present

statute to accomodate a situation for which it was never
intended, this Court should defer to the legislature, which
certainly has the power to direct by appropriate legislation
that the sale or use of information be taxed, as has been done
in the State of New York.

See Skaggs-Walsh, Inc. v. State

Tax Commission, 120 A.D. 2d 786, 501 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1986).
Finally, the taxpayer concedes that there is, in fact,
a distinction between information coded on magnetic computer
tape and the printed labels that are purchased.

If this Court

concludes that the money paid by the taxpayer was not for
services, and if the Court further determines that the purchase
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of the labels ought to be taxed, the taxpayer urges the Court
not to tax the use of the magnetic tapes.

The preprinted

labels purchased by the taxpayer were conceptually and
physically different from the magnetic tapes and were used in
an entirely different fashion.

The labels were applied

directly to the envelopes and placed in the mail.

The magnetic

tape, however, was used only to transfer the information into a
computer, following which the tapes could not be used.
Although the taxpayer contends that neither the use of the tape
or of the labels should be taxed, it recognizes that a
distinction does exist between the labels and the tapes that
might justify a different tax treatment for the two types of
items.
CONCLUSION
This court should review this case de novo and ought
not to give deference to the lower court's conclusions of law
based on the stipulated record.

Because the taxpayer was

paying for the list broker's services as much as for anything
else and because the taxpayer was purchasing intangible
information, this Court should reverse the lower court and hold
that the transactions at issue were not taxable and that the
taxpayer is entitled to a full refund.
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